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## ***U.S. Reviews China Policy in Light of White Paper***

The long-awaited State Department white paper, *United States Relations with China*, a monumental volume of 1,000 pages, undoubtedly marks an historic turning point in our China policy. Political critics of the Administration can no longer complain that the facts are obscure, for they are here published in great quantity, including the mysterious Wedemeyer report of September 1947. Their main import is, in Secretary Acheson's words, that "the ominous result of the civil war in China . . . was the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to influence but could not."

The white paper refers only to the past, but its analysis in the coming weeks should provide one chief basis for the formulation of a new American policy toward revolutionary Asia. With the help of a distinguished group of policy consultants headed by Ambassador-at-Large Philip C. Jessup, the Administration and the public now face the task of relating the United States constructively to the "internal forces" which are moulding China's history. Meanwhile the continued military success of the Chinese Communists, together with the white paper's clear proof that the Nationalists lost no battles for lack of American arms, should put an end to one phase of the debate over our China policy.

It can now be recognized once and for all that the rise to power of the Chinese Communists is more than a military feat and must be countered in more than a military way. A staunch advocate of military aid, General Claire Chennault, recently admitted (in *Life* for July 11) that

areas of anti-Communist resistance must show political, economic and spiritual progress before our arms can help them. We can all accept the fact that communism in China is operating on those many levels typical of great social upheavals, including a political overturn, economic reform, a remaking of social classes, a change of ideology. Its military strength is tied in with these other sources of strength.

### ***Material Aid Not Enough***

Recognition of these manifold sources of Communist power in China is not defeatism but realism: competition with communism in Asia is more difficult than advocates of military aid (or even of economic aid) have realized. A purely material effort, economic and military, will not save Asia from communism. The situation is less hopeful than in Western Europe, which has an industry, political system and ideological background similar to our own. To preserve any position at all in Asia, we must face the problem of relating our ideas and institutions, as well as our goods and skills, to Asian life. Now perhaps we can do this more creatively than ever before through a new over-all "bipartisan" Far Eastern and South Asian policy.

America is rich in the ingredients of such a policy. In addition to the goods and services that we can export, we have political doctrines of self-government and self-determination, moral values of individual freedom and legal institutions of civil liberty which all together form the most revolutionary ideology in world history. The welfare and liberty of the in-

dividual is a more genuinely revolutionary goal in Asia than the mere strengthening of the state through industrial, political and military organization.

Our problem is not that communism is an inevitable wave of the future in Asia, for in the long run we can be sure that our society has more to offer. Our problem is that communism, as a method of revolution, is offering more to Asia's masses in the immediate present: for Asia is inevitably caught up in those same revolutionary processes (use of the machine, of science, of literacy, of nationalism, and so forth) which the modern West has experienced in recent centuries, while we in America feel more conservative than revolutionary. We have looked at Asia and sought stability where the Russians have sought to lead the revolution. Since all aspects of Asian life face unavoidable change, our search for stability there is doomed if we make it a search for some status quo which we can support. Our only course is to lead the revolutionary process in Asia, work with it, not against it, and contribute more effectively than communism to the solving of Asia's problems.

Since few serious students are likely to challenge this general thesis, we may find in it a basis for a united national policy in which military men, economic specialists, social scientists, missionaries and every type of American can play his part. Yet Asia is so different from America that this new active policy requires thought and study even more than action. Our first problem is one of understanding. We can help and guide the great processes of

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change in Asia only after we realize what they are in practical terms. Thus far, unfortunately, the Communists have understood them better.

Let us first recognize the secret of Communist success, which is that real power in backward Asia comes from real reform. The Chinese Communists are doing many excellent and admirable things—measures for public health, literacy, emancipation of women, economic aid to the farmer—which their predecessors also advocated but never accomplished on so large a scale. Only by being “for the common people,” living their life, thinking their thoughts, seeing their problems, have the Chinese Communists been able to mobilize their peasant armies with the food to feed them and the popular support to make them victorious. The idealism of the “liberation” movement, to free the masses from poverty, disease, ignorance, exploitation and outward social restraints, still inspires the students of Communist China and sanctions the new regime. Like most new dynasties of China’s past, the new regime has come to power by organizing the peasantry and is consolidating its position by enlisting the literati.

Today we can see the totalitarian power structure in Communist China being cemented upon these foundations of genu-

ine reform. The party-and-state monopoly of all association and information is already visible in the manipulation of front organizations, control of the press, elimination of competing news sources—such as the United States Information Service—and widespread Marxist indoctrination.

Once we recognize that Communist political and military power is based upon genuine economic and social reform, we can forego the sterile bickering over our failure to save the Nationalists. Whether our military aid actually totaled \$100 million or \$1 billion, whether General Marshall was unwise to withhold it in 1946 or the Eightieth Congress unwise to increase it in 1948, the fact should be clear that it was peripheral to the main process of events in China, a marginal factor which in the end probably helped the Communists more than it hindered them.

### ***Intensive Study Needed***

Our immediate next step should be the intensive study of economic and social reform in Asia, the secrets of Communist success. This study should be made on the spot, all over non-Communist Asia, wherever American journalists, technicians and social scientists are welcomed. Financed both by government and by many private agencies, it should be on an in-

tensive wartime emergency scale. Hundreds and eventually thousands of young Americans should be recruited and sent to non-Communist Asia under a co-ordinated national program, before we think of large expenditures and shipments.

These American personnel of all sorts should aim to help the Asian leaders of reform. Leadership in Asia’s revolution, as Stalin’s success has shown, must emerge from the native peoples. We must associate ourselves with this nascent leadership as it emerges. But we can do so only by being on the spot, not by planning in Washington. We must develop direct contact with Asia’s grass roots, at least as direct as our matter-of-course contact with Britain and Western Europe. This contact must not be confined to governments and official channels. It is the first essential to an effective Point Four program. From it, and probably from it alone, can flow the practical ideas and activities, the inspiration and adaptation, whereby America can compete with communism in solving Asia’s problems.

J. K. FAIRBANK

(John King Fairbank spent seven years in China, concluding a variety of United States government services as Director of the United States Information Service in that country. At present he is in charge of the Regional Program on China at Harvard University. His book, *The United States in China*, was published last summer by the Harvard University Press.)

## ***Arms Aid Bill Raises Issues of European Unity***

WASHINGTON—If European nations, separated by diversity of cultures, traditions, commercial rivalries and languages, find it impossible to coalesce their distinct national military and economic interests, should the United States revise its foreign policy aid programs for Western Europe? Should Washington abandon the goal of unification? Or should it attempt to inspire greater unity by using its aid as a means of bargaining? These questions have become pressing for the Administration since Chairman John Kee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, acting for President Truman, introduced the military assistance bill on July 25 and since the Senate resumed consideration of the appropriation bill for the Economic Co-operation Administration on August 2.

### ***Military Integration***

Leading opponents of the military assistance program in its present form advocate that the potential European recipients of American arms work out a co-operative defense plan before Congress passes a per-

manent new lend-lease act. Senators Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan and H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey, both supporters of the active American postwar foreign policy, have indicated that they take that stand, although they are willing to accept some sort of temporary scheme for sending arms abroad.

The Congressional delay in voting funds for the ECA is due at least in part to the recent discovery at the Capitol that only a bare shadow of progress has been made toward the real integration of the individual recovery programs of the many Marshall Plan beneficiaries. Since the Senate in May 1947 approved the Fulbright Resolution, recommending that Europeans create their own United States, the State Department has encouraged Congress to believe both that this goal of unification is desirable and also that Europe was making concrete progress toward that goal. Yet even a workable customs union seems many years away. Would the State Department, therefore, be wise to dampen

Congressional ardor for a unified Europe and argue that close American ties with Western Europe are desirable whatever comes of the European unity movement or even the movement for a European trade federation?

The Administration itself hopes for solidarity abroad. The three Chiefs of Staff in the National Military Establishment (Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, Navy; General Omar N. Bradley, Army; and General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force) arrived in Europe on July 30 for conversations aimed eventually at the drafting of a combined strategic plan for the Atlantic powers, including the United States, the signers of the Brussels Western Union Treaty of March 17, 1948 (Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg), and the signers of the North Atlantic pact who are not in Western Union (Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal and Italy).

The subject of the talks was not wholly a new one for American military men.

The United States has been represented since July 1948 at the meetings in London of the military committee of the Western Union powers and is familiar with the difficulties in the way of creating a joint military plan for these five leading states of central Western Europe. Moreover, since the defeat of the Axis, the United States and Britain have held continuous military talks in the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee, created in 1942 during World War II, which has headquarters in Washington. The traveling Chiefs of Staff broadened the scope of these previous discussions by exchanging views with military representatives of Denmark, Norway, Portugal and Italy. They went abroad for a ten-day tour.

Coinciding with the first meeting of the Council of Europe on August 8 at Strasbourg, France, the visit of the Chiefs of Staff on behalf of European co-operation softened Congressional opposition to the military assistance program. The military leaders are expected to testify before both Senate and House committees after their return from Europe August 10, and their recommendations will carry greater weight after their on-the-spot investigations.

Moreover, the Administration made important concessions to its critics and revised the original Kee bill which would have allowed the President to aid "any" nation or any group within a nation when he considered such assistance would promote the security of the United States.

A new bill, dispensing with these wide discretionary powers, was introduced into Congress August 5. It maintained the full \$1.45 billion originally requested (including \$50 million already approved for Greece and Turkey). Under its terms, the North Atlantic powers would get \$1,160,990,000 in aid; Iran, Korea and the Philippines would get \$27,640,000; and Greece and Turkey an additional \$211,370,000. The size of the appropriation remains an important issue between the Administration and its critics. Senator John Foster Dulles, Republican, of New York, has commented that it "might or might not be too much," and some Congressional quarters are expected to ask for a cut of as much as 50 per cent.

### **Past Unifying Programs**

Although neither the original Kee bill nor its successor in itself is a unifying measure, the revised draft stresses that assistance is being given to "further the development" of common defense plans under the North Atlantic pact. Since the end of World War II, the United States has strengthened its ties in various ways to Western and Southern European powers without succeeding in its corollary effort to harden the attachment of those powers to one another.

The signatories of the Brussels treaty, which prepared the way for the North Atlantic pact and the military program,

stated sixteen months ago that they were "convinced . . . of the necessity of uniting in order to promote the economic recovery of Europe." Yet E. T. Dickinson, ECA program planning director, said in an address at Colgate University on July 25 that plans for commercial co-operation on the continent have not been put into effect, and Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York on July 18 recommended that "Marshall Plan money . . . be used primarily to help nations which are willing to help themselves by co-operating in bringing about a united Europe." Special trading interests of cartels have prevented faster progress toward realization of the Benelux (Belgium-Netherlands-Luxembourg) economic union. Efforts of Italy and France to create a customs union have been fruitless so far. In the military sphere the traveling Chiefs of Staff have found rivalry between France and Britain to provide the headquarters of the North Atlantic Defense Council, disagreement among all Western European powers about the proper division of arms to come from America and unwillingness on the part of individual powers to concentrate on single strategic undertakings, such as the proposal that France provide the bulk of Western Europe's ground forces. Whether European unity can yet be achieved despite these formidable obstacles remains an important test for American foreign policy.

BLAIR BOLLES

## **FPA Bookshelf**

*Foreign Governments, the Dynamics of Politics Abroad*, edited by Fritz Morstein Marx. New York, Prentice-Hall, 1949. \$6.35

Students of comparative government and contemporary world affairs will welcome this important contribution to the study of political dynamics in Western and Central Europe, Russia, Mexico, Brazil, China and Japan. Eight authorities on these various areas—Mario Einaudi, Andrew Gyorgy, John N. Hazard, Henry P. Jordan, Paul M. A. Lineberger, John Brown Mason, F. M. Marx, and W. Hardy Wickwar—discuss in each case the historical influences, governmental patterns, ideological framework and general significance of the countries under review. The dynamic approach and the inclusion of Asian and Latin American systems mark a significant innovation in works on comparative government.

*Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, by Sherman Kent. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1949. \$3.00

Professor Kent of Yale University analyzes the types of information needed in formulating policy, the problems of organizing to obtain the knowledge and the steps in the process of gathering and using intelligence. He shows a practical and scholarly grasp of the subject based not only upon his academic training but also upon years of experience with the OSS and with the State Department's Office of Research and Intelligence.

*Halfway to Freedom*, by Margaret Bourke-White. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1949. \$3.50

Magnificent photographs of India by one of America's most distinguished photographers, many of them taken in the midst of the dramatic events that followed the achievement of independence. An interesting text conveys a vivid impression of India's deep-seated problems as well as of its achievements.

*Socialist Britain*, by Francis Williams. New York, Viking, 1949. \$3.00

The former public relations adviser to Prime Minister Clement Attlee explains the aims and actions of the British Labor government lucidly and sympathetically. What the volume lacks in critical analysis, it makes up for in intimate, first-hand information, presenting a useful study for Americans interested in Britain's peaceful revolution.

*The Commonwealth and the Nations*, by Nicholas Mansergh. New York, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1949. \$2.50

A series of thoughtful essays analyzing the latest developments in the British Commonwealth, the position of Eire and the changes being wrought by admission of the new Asian dominions of India, Pakistan and Ceylon. The author, now a Royal Institute professor, served as assistant secretary in the Dominions Office in 1946-47.

*In Search of a Future: Persia, Egypt, Iraq, and Palestine*, by Maurice Hindus. Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, 1949. \$3.00

This impressionistic word picture of present day conditions in some Middle Eastern countries is particularly good for its interpretation of developments in Iran and its enthusiastic description of the ways in which the Jewish pioneers in Palestine have met and conquered the problem of making the desert bloom, thus setting an example applicable throughout the Moslem world.

*Peoples in Colonies*, by Kumar Goshal. New York, Sheridan House, 1948. \$3.50

The author of *The People of India* tells the story of the conquest and exploitation of the world's colonies, makes a blistering attack on imperialism and proposes some broad measures for solving these problems in which the achievements of the peoples of Soviet Asia, Communist China, Viet Nam, Indonesia and the Hukbalahaps are held up as models.

*Paths to the Present*, by Arthur M. Schlesinger. New York, Macmillan, 1949. \$3.00

In this series of illuminating essays the eminent Harvard historian discourses on various phases of American life, dispelling a number of popular illusions, and shedding new light on some of the forces which have contributed to the country's formation. The volume will be of



# News in the Making

particular interest to the student of foreign policy because of its section on "War and Peace" which deals with America's stake in one world, and explodes the myth of isolationism.

*Russia's Race for Asia*, by George Creel. New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 1949. \$2.75

A noted publicist argues that Moscow always has and will continue to have complete control over the Chinese Communists, that the Roosevelt-Truman policies are responsible for the debacle in China, and that we must adopt a "positive" policy, supporting Chiang Kai-shek. Whatever cogency there may be in the major theses of this effort is marred by the author's imprecision in dealing with matters of fact and logic.

*A Short History of the Middle East*, by George E. Kirk. Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1949. \$3.75

A compact, highly useful survey of one of the world's storm areas from the rise of Islam to modern times by a Britisher, member of the faculty of the Middle East Center for Arab Studies, who has succeeded to a remarkable degree in presenting objectively the clashing interests of the native peoples and of the various great powers.

*The World Must be Governed*, by Vernon Nash. New York, Harper, 1949. \$2.50

The vice-president of the United World Federalists, drawing upon extensive experience in lecturing and participating in discussions on world government throughout the United States, here analyzes some of the main problems. He discusses the advantages and disadvantages of world federal government, problems of achieving it, alternatives, the responsibility of the individual, and gives an account of the chief organizations in this field and their programs.

*Italy and Italians*, by Count Carlo Sforza. New York, Dutton, 1949. \$3.00

Utilizing the lectures he delivered at the University of California during 1942-43 while an anti-Fascist emigré (lectures which formed the basis for his earlier and more complete *Contemporary Italy*), Count Sforza, now Italian Foreign Minister, here presents a collection of interpretative essays and adds material on Italy's relations with its various neighbors. Deeply in love with his own country, he dwells affectionately on the qualities of his people and their "inexhaustible springs of vitality and youth."

*Last Call for Common Sense*, by James P. Warburg. New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1949. \$3.00

This collection of public addresses and special memoranda is by a former banker who during the war served as Director for Propaganda Policy in the OWI. Mr. Warburg effectively marshals his contentions regarding American foreign policy which, in his opinion, is trying to go in two different and conflicting directions—economic aid under the Marshall Plan, and military aid under the Truman Doctrine and the North Atlantic pact.

*Chinese-Russian Relations*, by Michel N. Pavlovsky. New York, Philosophical Library, 1949. \$3.75

A fascinating story based upon original Chinese and Russian sources, with particular emphasis upon the earliest period and the critical role played by Mongolia as a marginal area. While the author does not discuss contemporary Sino-Russian relations, the historical record reveals striking similarities and contrasts to present-day developments.

New developments in the *Tito-Cominform* rift are being watched for signs that Yugoslavia is moving toward greater co-operation with the West. Although Marshal Tito constantly reaffirms his Marxism, he made a strong speech in Macedonia August 2 hinting that he was ready to help Bulgaria and Albania oust their present Communist regimes. On August 4 Yugoslavia signed a one-year, \$90 million trade agreement with Italy by which Tito will get machinery in exchange for iron ore, nonferrous metals and other raw materials. . . . To encourage a return to *peaceful relations in the Middle East*, the United States and Britain on August 4 agreed to restrict arms shipments to the area to amounts reasonable for security needs. The step was recommended by Acting Mediator Ralph J. Bunche as the UN-inspired arms embargo was lifted. . . . Decks were cleared for *Egyptian elections in October*, the first since 1944, by the formation on July 27 of a "neutral" cabinet led by Hussein Sirry Pasha, veteran independent politician. Both major parties—the Saadists who have been in power and the Wafdist—are strongly nationalistic, and the campaign will center on such issues as the British garrison in the Suez Canal zone, Egypt's role in the Sudan and the Palestine settlement. . . . An important test for the *Council of Europe*,

opening its session at Strasbourg August 8, will be a proposal for the establishment of a common court to uphold a minimum convention on human rights. Adoption would mean surrender of a significant amount of national sovereignty. . . . Communist control of *Italy's labor movement*, exercised mainly through leadership of the General Italian Confederation of Labor, is being increasingly challenged by rival political parties. Christian Democrats have sponsored the Free Italian General Confederation of Labor, and Republicans and right-wing Socialists lead the Italian Workers Federation. A report from Rome on August 7 indicated that discussions are under way to merge these two groups by September. The new labor organization would probably have about 2 million members, compared with 4.5 million remaining in the Communist-led CGIL. . . . New disputes between Marshall Plan countries arising from *Britain's economic position* will be aired after August 15 when the OEEC meets in Paris. With the new drain on sterling reserves, Britain has estimated that it will need more than \$1.5 billion in the coming year, compared with \$923 million previously estimated. The issue will be whether the British are to get a bigger share of the reduced sum Congress is expected to appropriate.

*Monetary Reconstruction in Italy*, by Bruno Foa. New York, King's Crown, 1949. Published for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. \$2.25

A scholarly work, well documented and with ample statistical evidence, interprets monetary developments in Italy since the end of World War II against the background of Italy's general economic situation, with particular emphasis upon the problems of recovery, the contribution of the Marshall Plan and Italy's relation to the European economy as a whole.

*Western European Union, Implications for the United Kingdom*, by R. G. Hawtrey. New York, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1949. \$1.50

In this slim but provocative volume Professor Hawtrey has put into writing the thinking of a Royal Institute study group on the implications of European co-operation, particularly for Britain. The detailed discussion of some of the problems involved in economic co-operation is especially significant. Other parts deal with political and military co-operation and various concrete proposals which have been put forward.

*Population Transfers in Asia*, by Joseph B. Schectman. New York, Hall'sby Press, 1949. \$1.50

A careful student of minority problems, the author of *European Population Transfers, 1939-1945*, in this little volume turns his attention to some of the major refugee movements in southern and western Asia. He includes an account of the monumental and tragic Hindu-Moslem population exchange which followed partition, the movement of Armenians to Soviet Armenia, the little known case of the Assyrians and a timely analysis of the Arab-Jewish problem in Palestine, with proposals for an organized resettlement program.

*Union Now, a Proposal for an Atlantic Federal Union of the Free*, Postwar Edition, by Clarence K. Streit. New York, Harper, 1949. \$3.00

This new edition brings back into print a well-known book which has been the mainspring of the movement for Federal Union of fifteen democracies as a nucleus for ultimate development of a universal federal union. The original text is reproduced and a supplementary section entitled "Postwar Conclusion" evaluates the present situation, finds the proposal more valid than ever, and suggests immediate objectives.

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